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INTRODUCTION

H
IERARCHICAL and large scale systems have received considerable attention during the last few years; firstly because of their importance in engineering, economics, and other areas, and secondly because of the increased capability of computer facilities [13], [14] . An important characteristic of many large scale systems is the presence of many decision makers with different and usually conflicting goals. The existence of many decision makers who interact through the system and have different goals may be an inherent property of the system under consideration (e.g., a market situation), or may be simply the result of modeling the system as such (e.g., a large system decomposed to subsystems for calculation purposes). Differential games are useful in modeling and studying dynamic systems where more than one decision maker is involved. Most of the questions posed in the area of the classical control problem may be considered in a game situation, but their resolution is generally more difficult. In addition, many questions can be posed in a game framework, which are meaningless or trivial in a classical control problem framework. The superior conceptual wealth of game over control problems, which makes them potentially much more applicable, counterbalances the additional difficulties encountered in their solution.
A particular class of games are the so-called Stackelberg differential games [ 11-[SI. Stackelberg games provide a natural formalism for describing systems which operate on many different levels with a corresponding hierarchy of decisions. The mathematical definition of a general recommended by D.
Ji: U X V+R, i= 1,2.
(1)
We consider the set valued mapping T
T: U+V, ut+ TuC
defined by
Tu={uIu=arginf [J2(u,G); G E V ] } .
(3)
Clearly Tu = 0 if the i n f in definition (3) is not achieved.
We also consider the minimization problem infJ, (u,u) subject to: u E U , .o E Tu, where we use the usual convention J,(u, u) = + ca if u E Tu = 0.
(4)
Definition: A pair (u*,o*) E U X V is called a Stackelberg equilibrium pair if (u*, u*) solves (4).
The sets U and V are called the leader's and follower's strategy spaces, respectively. The game situation described by the mathematical formulation above is as follows. The follower tries to minimize his cost function J,, for a given choice of u E U by the leader. The leader knowing the follower's rationale, wishes to announce a u* such that the follower's reaction u* to this given u* will result to the minimum possible J,(u*,u*). The general N-level Stackelberg game is defined analogously. Stackelberg differential games were first introduced and studied in the engineering literature in [2] and further studied in [3]- [8] . They are mathematically formalized as follows:
t ) =f(x(t),G( t ) , W , t), X ( to) = x,
J , ( u , v ) = g i ( n ( t , ) , t , ) + S f '~, ( x ( t ) , u ( t ) , G ( t ) , t )~t ,
where f, g,, Li are appropriately defined functions. Also, u E U, .o E V, where U, V are appropriately defined function spaces and E(r), G(I) are the values of u and u, respectively, at time t, i.e., zi(t)=ulf, G(t)=ul,. The type of strategy spaces U and V which were considered and 00l8-9286/79/0400-0155$00.75 01979 IEEE treated successfully in the previous literature were the spaces of piecewise continuous functions of time. In this case, the problem of deriving necessary conditions for the Stackelberg differential game with fixed time interval and initial condition xo, falls within the area of classical control. Thus, variational techniques can be used in a straightforward manner. The case where the strategy spaces are spaces of functions whose values at instant t depend on the current state x ( t ) and time I , i.e., ii(t)= uI, = u(x(t), t), 5(t) = t'l I = o(x(t), t), was not treated. This case results in a nonclassical control problem because & / a x appears in the follower's necessary conditions. Since the follower's necessary conditions are seen as state differential equations by the leader, the presence of au/ax in them makes the leader face a nonclassical control problem.
In the present paper, the nonclassical control problem arising from the consideration of the above strategy spaces is embedded in a more general class of nonclassical control problems; see (20)-(22) . The characteristics of this general class of problems are the following: 1) each of the components ui, of the control m-vector u, depends on the current time t and on a given function of the current state and time, i.e., u'I,=u'(h'(x(t),t),t); 2) the state equation and the cost functional depend on the first-order partial derivative of u with respect to the state x . The vector valued functions hi may represent outputs or measurements available to the ith "subcontroller," in a decentralized control seting. The only restriction to be imposed on h i is to be twice continuously differentiable with respect to x . This allows for a quite large class of hi's whch can model output feedback or open-loop control laws. It can also model mixed cases of open-loop and output feedback control laws where during only certain intervals of time an output is available. The appearance of the partial derivative of u with respect to x prohibits the restriction of the admissible controls to those which are functions of time only. It will become clear that the extension of our results to the case where higher order partial derivatives of u with respect to x , up to order N, appear is straightforward. This case is of interest in hierarchical systems since it arises, for example, in an N-level Stackelberg game where the players use control values dependent on the current state and time. Although the bulk of the analysis provided in this paper concerns continuous-time problems, the corresponding discrete-time results can be derived in a very similar manner.
The structure of the present paper is as follows: In Section I a two-level Stackelberg differential game is introduced for a fixed time interval [to, $1 and initial condition x(to) = xo. The leader's and follower's strategies are functions of the current state and time. This game leads to the consideration of a nonclassical control problem which is studied in Section 11. In Section 111 we use the results of Section I1 to study further the game of Section I, and in particular we work out a linear quadratic Stackelberg game. In Section IV the relation of the Stackelberg game, introduced in Section I, to the principle of optimality is investigated. Finally we have a Conclusions section and two Appendices. For a function f: R"+Rm we say that f E C k if f has continuous mixed partial derivatives of order k. For f:
R"+R, Vf is considered an n X 1 column vector and f,, denotes the Hessian off. For$ Rn+ R m, V f is considered an n X m matrix (Jacobian). For f: R" X R k+R "', where Consider the dynamic system
and the functionals J , ( u , c ) = g ( x ( r / ) ) + J " L ( x ( f ) . u ( t ) , t -( r ) , t )~r (9) r0 J2(u.c)=h(x(t,))+lr'M(x(t),U(t),Z1(t),t) (10) where U E U, c E V , x is the state of the system, assumed to be a continuous function of r and piecewise in C' w.r. 
We further assume that U is properly topologized. Conditions (12) define a set valued mapping T ' : U-+ V . By using the nature of the defined U and V and the fact that (12) are necessary but not sufficient conditions it is easily proven that
Notice that J2(u,o) takes one value for given u and uqy u E Tu, while J2(u, o ' ) , o' E T'u does not necessarily do so. We assume now the following.
Assumption A: 'u, uETu, uEU$ (13) where U: is a n.b.d. of u* in U. For Assumption A to hold it suffices for example: T = T' on U;.' We conclude that if Assumption A holds, then u* is a local minimum of the problem minimize J, ( u , u )
The problem (14) is a nonclassical control problem of the 'See Appendix A.
type to be considered in the next section, since the partial derivative of the control u w.r. to x appears in the constraints (15) which play the role of the system differential equations and state control constraints, with new state ( x ' ,~' ) ' .
Notice that the leader uses only x ( t ) and t in evaluating u(x(t),t) and not the whole state (XI,$)';
i.e., the value of u at time r is composed in a partial feedback form with respect to the state (x/,$)'; (recall the output feedback in contrast to the state feedback control laws). If one were concerned with a Stackelberg game composed of N (> 2) hierarchical decision levels [7] , [8] , then the leader would face a nonclassical control problem where the ( N -1)th partial of u with respect to x would appear. We will assume that the state-control constraint (15c) can be solved for u over the whole domain of interest to give
where S is continuous and in C ' w.r. to x and p . This assumption holds in many cases, as for example in the linear quadratic case to be considered in the next section. In any case, direct handling of the constraint (15c) by appending it, or assumption of its solvability in u, does not seem to be the core of the matter from a game point of view. However, the following remark is pertinent here.
Assume that we allow u E v, where
~= { o~u : R " X [ t o , t f ]~R "~, v ( x , t ) piecewise continuous in t and Lipschitzian in x (17) where x E R" and t E [ t o , t f ] }
instead of u E V . The assumption of solvability of (15c) will again give o ( x , t ) = S(X,P, u, t).
Since o ( x , t ) will be substituted in the rest of (15) with S(x,p, u,t) from (18), the leader will be faced with exactly the same problem as after substituting u(t) with S from (16). Therefore, no additional difficulty arises if one allows v instead of V and assumes solvability of (15c).
Substituting o from (16) to (15) 
u$h'(x,t),t) exists and u'(h'(x,t),t), ui(h'(x,t),t) are con-
tinuous in x and piecewise continuous in t , for x E R", t E [LO, $1, i = 1; -. , m so as to minimize J(u). We denote by I/ the set of all such 24's. Therefore, the problem under investigation is minimize J( u ) subject to u E e and (20).
(22)
'The restriction h E C ' w.r. to x is somewhat strong. For example, the case h(x,t)=x if t , < t < t , h(x,t)=O if t l < t <~, i.e., the state is available only during a part of the [ te9] is not mcluded. Nonetheless, it can be approximated arbitrarily close by a C2 function, like any function which is only piecewise c2. consequently, from an engineering point of view, h E C w.r. to x is not a serious restriction.
This problem is posed for a fixed time interval [to, r,] and a fixed initial condition x(to) = x,. Therefore, the solution u*, if it exists, will in general be a function of to, r,, xo, in addition to being a function of h(x,t), t, but we do not show this dependence on t, r,, x. explicitly.
We use the notation
It should be pointed out that the arguments used in classical control theory for showing that for the fixed initial point case, it is irrelevant for the optimal trajectory and cost whether the control value at time t is composed by using x(r) and t or only t,3 do not apply here in general. If uI, = u(t), t E [to, 91, then u, =O and this changes the structure of problem (22). Consideration of variations of u, is also needed and this was where the previous researchers stopped; see [4]. This problem is successfully treated here. We provide two different ways of doing that, the first of which is based on an extension (Lemma 2.1) of the so-called "fundamental lemma" in the Calculus of Variations (see [ 121). is an optimal closed-loop control law generating an optimal trajectory x*(r), then u*(t) u*(x*(t),t) is an admissible open-loop control law.
The following theorem provides necessary conditions for a function u E 0 to be a solution to the problem (22) in a local sense; (we assume that u is properly topologized). It is assumed in this theorem that the optimum u* has strong differentiability properties, an assumption which w i l l be relaxed later, in Theorem 2.1. The proof of this theorem is based on the following lemma. 
hold for t €[to, 91, where all the partial derivatives are evaluated at
The proof of this theorem by using variational techniques and Lemma 2.1 is simple but lengthy. For the sake of completeness, we gwe it in Appendix B.
We now give a different derivation of the results of Theorem 2.1', under weaker assumptions, which provides an interpretation for them and at the same time an extension of the region of their validity. Let +~~( x , u , v , h ' ( x , t ) u , , . --,V,h"(X,t)U",t)dt
Vxh"(x,t)Em,t), x(t,)=x, t E [ 1 , , $ ]
U€Um, ~E U , , i = l , . -. , m . (29) Clearly, if J:, 3; are the infima of (22) and (29), respectively, it will be J: <J$. Also, if U= (I?', -* , U")', ul,. -, u, solve (29) and give rise to x(t), then a u=
.
"(h"(x(t), t), t ) u~(h'(x(t),t),t)=V,h'(x(t),t)ii;:(t)
and gives rise to the same x(t). However, such u E U does exist. For example, we set
u'(h'(x,t),t)=a,'(t)h'(x,t)+b,(t)
where
bi(t)=Ui(t)-aJ!(t)h'(x(t),t),
This u satisfies (30). Thus, problems (29) and (22) are actually equivalent, in the sense that for each given (x,,,t,,) they have the same optimal trajectories and costs and their optimal controls are related by (30).
The conditions of Theorem 2.1' are now directly verified to be the necessary conditions for problem (29), where one should use U and in place of u and u$, respectively. More importantly, the conditions of T h e e . rem 2.1' hold if one considers simply u* E G, without assuming that z$ is in C ' w.r. to x in a n.b.d of
{(h'(x*(t),t),t), t~[ t~, $ ] } .
This weakens the strong differentiability property of u* assumed in Theorem 2.1'. The relative independence of u, $i, was exploited in proving Theorem 2.1', when the special form of the perturbation cp(y,t), y'#(t) (see proof of Lemma 2.1), sufficed to conclude (25) and (26). This independence of u and u$ was taken a priori into consideration when problem (29) was formulated. Clearly, even if higher order partial derivatives of u w.r. to x appear in f and L, or if u, u$ are restricted to take values within certain closed sets, the equivalence of the corresponding problems (22) and (29) holds again --(with appropriate modifications of the definitions of lJ, U,, f, and L). We formalize the discussion above in the following theorem. 
+ [~, ( t ) --x , ( t )~( t ) ] . [ x , --x , ( t ) ]
iii) Let X , ii, i i l be as in ii). Assume that the scalar valued functions u(x, f), u(x, t ) satisfy u(T(t), t ) = u(T(t), t ) =ii(t) and u,(rr(t),t)=u,(rr(r),t)=ii,(t). Then so do the functions 2uu/(u + t?), G , d m , assuming that u and t? are properly behaved.
0
The proof of this proposition is a matter of straightforward verification. The assumption in parts ii) and iii) for scalar valued quantities actually induces no loss of conceptual generality since it can be abandoned at the expense of increased complexity of the corresponding expressions, of course.
The nonuniqueness of the solution u to problem (22) is obvious in the light of (30) One very basic difference between problems (22) and (29) is the following. It is clear that the principle of optimality holds for both of these problems, in the sense that the last piece of each optimal trajectory is optimal. (22) and (29) emphasizes the fact that their equivalence holds in a restricted fashon, i.e., for each initial point considered independently and not in a global fashion, as a closedloop control law treats the initial points.
Two final remarks before entering the next section are pertinent here. First, that the established equivalence of given in terms of (a V(x,t) 
satisfies u(F(r),r)=ii(t), u,(X(t),t)= E,($
. I the problems (22) and (29) reduces all questions of existence, uniqueness, controllability, and of sufficiency conditions for problem (22) to the corresponding ones for (29). Any problem of the form (22) where terminal wnstraints and control constraints are present can be solved and necessary and sufficient conditions can be written down in as much as this can be done for the problem (29) with the corresponding constraints considered in addition. Second, Theorem 2.1 still holds if instead of the initial condition x(t0)=x0, it is given: x a ( t o ) = x t and x8(tr>= x!, where x = ( x a', x 8')'. In this case, (38) is modified to where the more general cost functional
J=g(xa((tr))+h(xP(to))+J'L(x,u,t) dt (40)
10 is considered (see [lo] ).
SOLUTION OF THE STACKELBERG GAME
In this section we analyze the Stackelberg game of Section I by using the results of Section 11. In particular, we work out a linear quadratic Stackelberg game, where the leader is penalized for ui as well.
Let us consider the Stackelberg game of Section I. In this case, the hi's for the leader (u), are and the hi's for the follower ( u ) are identically zero. Different hi's may be used to model different information structures in terms of x ( t ) , and t available to the leader and follower at time t . Thus, Theorem 2.1 is applicable and can be used for writing down the leader's necessary conditions. From the results of the previous section, we conclude that the solution for the leader's u, if it exists, is not unique. It is interesting to notice that (31) implies that the leader has nothing to lose if he commits himself to an affine in x , time-varying strategy. With such a commitment, the leader does not deteriorate this cost, does not alter the optimal trajectory, and also the follower's optimal cost is not affected. More noteworthy is that the affine choice for the leader can be made even iff, L, M are nonlinear and u, ui are constrained to take values in given closed sets. In addition, u may be constrained to take values in a given closed set in which case (15c) should be substituted by an appropriate inequality. In accordance with the discussion in the previous section, we have that in general there does not exist a strategy u(x,t) which is optimal for every initial point (xo,to) in a subset of R n + ' .
Let X=(X',,X;)' denote the adjoint variable for problem (19) with X,, X, corresponding to x and p , respectively.
Then, condition (37) results in [ Mu(& u, S(X,P, u, t ) , t ) +f,(x,u,S(x,p,u,t),r)p]X;=O V t q to,$]'
(4 1) which will generally make the leader's problem singular [9] . This is to be expected because the leader exerts his influence through the time functions resulting from u and u,, which are actually quite independent, and u, is not penalized or subjected to any constraint in the initial formulation (8)-(9). In other words, the leader is more powerful than what a first inspection of the original problem indicates. One way to restrict the leader's strength or to avoid the singular problem could be the inclusion of ui in L, i.e., L = L(x,u,uj,--,u,", t), which would model a self-disciplined leader, or to impose apriori bounds on u,, for example, 11 ui 11 Q K , Vt E[ to, $1, which could be interpreted as a constitutional restrictlon on a real life leader.
It could be suggested to the follower to penalize ui in his criterion while ui is not penalized in the leader's criterion. This would lead to the appearance of uix in (19) (assuming ui, exists). Thus, in addition to (41), a similar condition due to u; appears which reinforces the singular character of the problem. If the leader now restricts himself to affine strategies in x , then u;, =O and the resulting optimum is as before. Actually, the leader can restrict himself to a quadratic strategy in x (without affecting his global optimum cost and trajectory) having thus three influences on the system, namely u, u,, u,!,, from which only u is penalized in the leader's criterion. Therefore, the leader w i l l do better. For the follower, it is not obvious if he will do better or not.
Let us work out a linear quadratic Stackelberg game. The leader is penalized for ui as well, by including it in L. We consider the dynamic system 
The necessary conditions for the leader in accordance with Theorem 2.1 are (50), (51), (52) which can be substituted into (50) Equations (62)- (65) show that the leader's problem can be considered as a team problem under the "constraint" (61), with optimal solution, say (u*,v*) and (66)- (68) show that the same v* must be the follower's optimal reaction to the leader's choice u*. Actually, (61) is not at all a constraint, since with A230, (5 l), (where ui appears) is not really considered by the leader. So, the leader operating under (50).and wanting to minimize (43) may as well choose ui =0, since he is penalized for ui, while ut does not appear in (50). The same analysis and conclusions carry over to the more general game of Section I [see (6)- ( 10) and (16)] since the condition X2=0 on [to, t,] comes from the demand that the transversality conditions hold V t E[ t , $] and is not affected by the fact that in (9) ui is not penalized. Notice that if the leader's cost functional (9) (69) then (61) holds again.
The idea behind the condition A2=0 on [to, t,] is that the leader is not redly constrained by the follower's adjoint equation and therefore the leader's problem, being independent of the follower's problem, becomes a team control problem.
In conclusion, a necessary condition for the principle of optimality to hold for the Stackelberg games of Section I (and 111), is that the leader's problem is actually a team control problem. But for a control problem with fixed initial conditions, the principle of optimality does hold. We thus have the "if and only if" statement: the principle of optimality holds for the problems of Section I (and 111) (see (6)-(lo), (16) and (42)-(a), respectively) if and only if the leader's problem is a team control problem for both the leader and follower.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In the present paper, a nonclassical control problem motivated by Stackelberg games was introduced and analyzed. Problems of this type arise in the study of hierarchical systems and take into account several information patterns that might be available to the controllers. Two different approaches were presented. The first uses variational techniques, while the second reduces the nonclassical problem to a classical one. The nonexistence of closed-loop control laws for this problem was shown. The nonuniqueness of the solution of this problem was considered and explained. The results obtained for this nonclassical control problem were used to study a Stackelberg differential game where the players have current state information only ((x(t),t) ). Necessary conditions that the optimal strategies must satisfy were derived. The inapplicability of dynamic programming to Stackelberg dynamic games was explained and discussed. The singular character of the leader's problem was proven and the nonuniqueness of his strategies was proven and characterized. In particular, it was shown that commitment of the leader to an affine time-varying strategy does not induce any change to the optimal costs and trajectory. A linear quadratic Stackelberg game was also worked out as a specific application.
We end by outlining certain generalizations of the work presented here. We consider, first, the discrete-time versions. Consider the dynamic system A discrete-time version of the Stackelberg game of Section I can be defined (see [8n, and analyzed similarly to Section 111. Several information patterns can be exploited by employing different hi's (see [SI) . The restriction of the leader to affine strategies can also be imposed in the discrete case. The linear quadratic discrete analog of problem (42)- (44) can also be worked out in a similar way.
The case where higher order partial derivatives of u w.r. to x appear in (20) and (21) can be treated, and all the analysis of Section I1 carries over. One should assume higher order differentiability of the functions involved. Lemma 2.1 can easily be extended to the case where higher order of partials of rp w.r. toy appear, making the proof of the corresponding Theory 2.1' possible. We can also restrict ui to a polynomial form in terms of the hi's. The analog of Theorem 2.1 can be easily stated and proven and Proposition 2.1 also carries over. inf [J,(u,u) ; U E U,, U E Tu] > i n f [ J , ( u , u ) ; u E U , u E T u ] >inf [J,(u,u);uEU,uET'u] =inf [J,(u,u) ; u E u,, UET'U].
(A-2)
Proof.. The inequalities follow from the facts U, G U,
The last equality is obvious in the light of (3 1) and the proof of Theorem 2.1.
0
An immediate conclusion of Lemma A.l is that if inf [J,(u,u) The discussion in the present Appenhx generalizes clearly to the case where each ui depends on h'(x,t) instead of x and to the case where different Ul's are considered; see for example Proposition 2.1ii).
As an example where Proposition A.l can be applied, we consider the linear quadratic game of Section 111. For fixed rp we consider
J(E)=J(u+Erp).
Since J(B) is in C' w.r. to E and u* is a local optimum, it must hold that 9 /c=o=o. The dynamic Stackelberg solution is mostly appropriate in nonzero-sum two-person dynamic (differential) games when one of the players (the leader) has the ability (or enough power) to enforce his strategy on the other player (the follower). Hence, as opposed to the Nash equilibrium solution concept, the roles of the players are not symmetric in this case. In deterministic differential games, when the players have access to only open-loop information, it is relatively simpler to obtain the necessary conditions that Stackelberg strategies should satisfy, and it is even possible to obtain the optimal strategies explicitly in the case of linear-quadratic (LQ) problems [2] . [SI. However, in a 
